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X3 Force Field · dotx3.net · NEAR Hackathon

Proposed Allowed 0 Refused 0Illustration, not live transactions

Your AI agent can be talked into anything. Your money can't.

X3 Force Field is programmable security for AI agents: owners write typed .x3 mandates, agents propose .x3 payment programs, the compiler rejects unsafe edits and NEAR Guard checks signed 1Click terms. The model cannot authorize a payment.

Open the Judge ConsoleTry to break itWatch an Agent Play

Mainnet: the agent paid from its vault

A completed 5-USDC payment, from exact owner approval to a finalized NEAR payout.

Archived mainnet · November 14, 2026Owner-approved · agent-executedSettled · minimum met

Your policy sets the budget. You approve the exact quote. The agent executes the allowed payment from a PDA-owned vault: 5 USDC on Solana → 4.999746 USDC to x3lang.near.

  1. Solana mainnet

    1. Owner approved the quote

    Exactly 5 USDC

    Nonce 1 binds the amount, deposit account, quote digest and expiry. The owner signs this approval.

    Inspect owner approval

  2. Solana mainnet

    2. Agent executed from the vault

    5.000000 USDC

    The dedicated agent signs execution. The policy PDA authorizes the inner SPL token transfer from the vault.

    Inspect agent transfer

  3. NEAR mainnet

    3. USDC delivered on NEAR

    4.999746 USDC

    The finalized token event pays x3lang.near, above the signed 4.974757-USDC minimum. Provider status: SUCCESS.

    Inspect NEAR payout

The policy after settlement

5 USDC per payment and per rolling 24 hours. Nonce 1 consumed. No pending approval. Vault balance: 0 USDC. The archived post-state records one 5-USDC spend.

Read the settlement and policy state

What a judge can try

Edit a payment in the policy checker and inspect its decision locally. Then follow the real mainnet receipts here. These checks require no wallet connection or funds.

Try the policy checker

Proof boundaries and trust assumptions
  • The owner approved this exact quote before the agent executed it. This is one bounded pilot, not unrestricted autonomous spending.
  • The Solana policy PDA enforced this transfer. This pilot adds no new NEAR Guard call; the earlier invoice_06 Guard proof is separate.
  • Finalized source and payout observations used one RPC per chain. Provider SUCCESS links the two legs; cryptographic solver causality and cross-chain atomicity are not proven.
  • The owner retains upgrade authority. No external contract audit or reproducible source-to-SBF build identity is established by this proof.

The generic receipt verifier rejects the differing request/program deadlines. The original receipt is preserved; the archive uses separate vault-commitment, source-event and direct payout checks.

Read the complete proofView offline verifierInspect the signed quote

Historical evidence pinned to X3Lang 9ec3b48. This page does not request a quote, sign a transaction or spend funds.

Earlier proof: NEAR Guard authorized invoice_06

One real payment on NEAR and Solana mainnet, from the owner's rule to the recorded outcome. What it does not prove is on the same screen.

Mainnet · Solana → NEARSigned 1Click quoteNonce mainnet_demo_nov11_invoice_06

The owner wrote the rules in .x3. A restricted agent key got the payment past Guard's 21 checks. The owner funded 25 USDC on Solana, and 24.9952 USDC reached x3lang.near on NEAR.

  1. 1 · Owner approved

    NEAR mainnet

    approve_intent

    x3lang.near approved this intent before any agent call.

    GFdQLrzT…X5fsK6

  2. 2 · Guard accepted

    NEAR mainnet

    21 / 21 checks

    The agent's restricted key accepted the signed 1Click quote. The receipt returns 21 guards, all passing: recipient, asset, caps, refund, slippage, fees, approval, deadline and quote terms.

    Eg75uehw…Agu153

  3. 3 · Deposited

    Solana mainnet

    25.000000 USDC

    The owner signed the deposit to the quoted address from the funding wallet named in the mandate.

    4zhGYyWN…2RkXo5

  4. 4 · Delivered

    NEAR mainnet

    24.995200 USDC

    intents.near paid native USDC to x3lang.near, 84 seconds after the deposit.

    8jfbACLS…XPw43P

  5. 5 · Outcome recorded

    NEAR mainnet

    Settled · floor met

    The restricted agent key recorded the settlement on Guard: 24995200 out, both transaction hashes stored.

    9sTn9pJ1…CCzuqE

Accounts and keys

Guard contract · code hash
x3lang.near · BPdpJAw8…ZFb15T
Agent key that signed (FunctionCall, 3 Guard methods)
x3-agent.x3lang.near · ed25519:J3NiU8…JdP11x
Also on the agent account (FullAccess recovery, unused)
ed25519:8teaXG…68c23u
Funding wallet (Solana)
58tbMfad…zhB3cQ

What this does not prove

  1. The owner manually signed the Solana deposit from the funding wallet. First-party records identify it as the owner's; the chain shows the signer, not who controls it.
  2. Guard does not hold or move the USDC. A holder of the funding wallet's key could pay without Guard.
  3. The agent account still has the owner's FullAccess recovery key next to its restricted key. That key signed none of these calls.
  4. The recorded outcome is the agent's report. Guard stores the supplied transaction hashes and checks the amount against the floor; it does not authenticate the hashes.
  5. The Solana deposit and the NEAR payout are linked by 1Click status, timing and amount, not by a cryptographic cross-chain proof.
  6. Guard checks the stored .x3 hashes; it does not compile or run .x3. X3VM is not on the deployed authorization path.
  7. One settlement of about $25. It does not establish production reliability.

One-page proof card · Link-by-link check · Evidence bundle · Outcome readback · Raw public RPC observation · Observer run · Reviewed November 13, 2026 against X3Lang f2a01a2

Watch · 2:27

Payment. Limits. Proof.

Follow invoice_06 from the original .x3 mandate through local refusals, mainnet authorization, the owner-funded payment and recorded outcome. Narrated with captions.

Mainnet cards summarize archived receipts; terminal output is a local replay, not a new payment. The owner manually funded the deposit. Guard is noncustodial and does not authenticate outcome hashes; provider linkage is not cryptographic cross-chain atomicity.

Download MP4

Download captions · Previous cut: dramatization, testnet and local scenes

Situation Report

Case file 01, then the ledger. Every line ends at a finalized transaction or a published log.

CASE FILE 01

Agent intent · repo example

from Solana.USDC amount 25000000
to Near.USDC receiver attacker.near
under mandate x3-owner.near

8 mandate checkspass

mandate_recipientFAIL

Live testnet refusal of the same recipient (testnet owner and agent accounts): tx AhVBD7oXfwsixBipupjCzuhNdqunjdXJnLz3LXnmfnN8 · block 276557981

Ledger

Finalized on chain or publicly logged. Testnet unless marked.

  • MAINNET25 USDC Solana → 24.9952 USDC NEAR after a restricted agent key passed 21 Guard checks on the signed 1Click quote. The original .x3 files match the stored hashes; the owner signed the deposit; the agent recorded Settled.invoice_06 evidence
  • REFUSEDAgent intent paying attacker.near stopped by mandate_recipientAhVBD7oX…nmfnN8
  • ALLOWEDSame mandate, permitted recipient: intent_registeredDPJfcRUG…9FvTct
  • SETTLED1.000000 test USDC Base Sepolia → 0.997400 on NEAR, one .x3 program (trusted Tidepool relay)EBEBxJNg…FyCm1d
  • HELD 8/8Red team: a scripted model obeys all 8 attacks and deterministic checks refuse all 8; a real qwen3:8b run also held 8/8redteam log

What .x3 does

One policy. The compiler checks it. Guard checks it again. The model does not get a vote.

.x3 protocol mark

The owner writes the rule

A mandate names the agent, the asset, the caps, the recipient, slippage, fees, and when the owner must approve.

The agent writes a program

The payment is another .x3 file. If it pays the wrong account, drops the nonce, or breaks a cap, it does not compile or Guard refuses it.

Settlement is labeled

Mainnet vault pilot: an agent sent 5 USDC and 4.999746 USDC reached NEAR. Earlier invoice_06: 25 USDC from Solana, 24.9952 USDC delivered on NEAR after Guard accepted the official signed 1Click quote. The earlier Base Sepolia trade remains testnet evidence. Guard authorization and wallet custody are different claims.

Give agents work. Set their spending boundaries.

Business use cases for X3 Force Field: make payment authority explicit, reviewable, and tied to evidence.

Businesses using payment agents

Check a proposed supplier or service payment against approved recipients, assets, budgets, fees, and deadlines. Keep exceptions subject to owner approval before funding.

Treasury teams and DAOs

Express delegated spending rules in readable, versioned .x3 mandates. Review what an agent may propose and what needs approval before expanding its responsibilities.

Wallet and payment platform builders

Integrate deterministic policy checks at the signing or execution boundary. The protection depends on routing the actual spending authority through those checks.

Security and compliance teams

Inspect the proposal, mandate, Guard decision, and settlement receipts together. That trail supports review and incident investigation; it does not establish legal compliance.

These are intended uses, not claims of customer adoption. The current proof shows Guard authorization with a separately funded wallet; Guard cannot stop an independent wallet keyholder from transferring directly.

A capable agent needs boundaries and receipts.

The goal is an agent you can trust with useful work. AI, .x3, Guard, and blockchain each handle a different part of that job.

AI proposes the work

An agent can interpret a request and propose a payment program. A persuasive prompt or a confident answer does not grant it spending authority.

.x3 and Guard check the terms

The compiler checks the typed program; Guard evaluates the mandate and signed quote terms. Approval belongs to the owner where the mandate requires it.

Blockchain records settlement

A separately authorized funding wallet executes the payment. Finalized chain receipts let reviewers inspect what settled, then compare it with the approved terms.

This matters because a useful decision, permission to spend, and proof of delivery are three separate questions. Connecting them can make delegation more accountable and mistakes easier to investigate.

A “perfect agent” is the ambition, not a security guarantee. Blockchain can permanently record a bad payment. Policy checks only cover their rules and enforcement path, and a recorded outcome still needs independent receipt verification.

Chain of command

Authority runs one way. The agent is third in line and cannot approve itself.

  1. 01 · HIGH COMMANDThe ownerSigns a mandate once. Can revoke it any time.
  2. 02 · RULES OF ENGAGEMENTThe .x3 mandateRecipients, assets, per-payment and 24h caps, slippage, fees, approvals, expiry.
  3. 03 · TEAM SIXThe agentsInvestigate and propose. They write intents; they can't approve them.
  4. 04 · X3 GENERALThe contractCompares every intent to the mandate on NEAR. Deterministic. Fail-closed.

How a decision moves

The program names Base, Solana, or NEAR. Guard checks the quote and mandate. A separate funding wallet makes the deposit; finalized receipts show delivery.

  1. 01

    Base

    Bridge to NEAR

  2. 02

    Solana

    Bridge to NEAR

  3. 03

    NEAR

    Already there

  4. 04

    Guard

    Quote terms or refusal

Testnet trade demo

Protocol mark in motion. The trade it stands for is on Inspect the Proof: testnet, not mainnet.

Proof meter

Three published milestones, including the official mainnet settlement. The remaining five show exactly what evidence is still needed.

38%

Proofs posted: 3 / 8

A milestone counts only when its proof is public: a finalized transaction, a merged change with tests, or a published report. Each of the same eight milestones has equal weight. 37.5% exact coverage, rounded to 38% for display.

Reviewed November 13, 2026 against X3Lang f2a01a2. This measures published proof, not a security rating or a hackathon score.

  1. 1. Cross-chain testnet transfer authorized by Guard

    Posted

    1 test USDC sent on Base Sepolia after Guard approved the exact .x3 program on NEAR testnet; 0.9974 test USDC delivered to x3lang.testnet. Testnet, through a trusted relayer: not atomic, not mainnet.

    Evidence and limitsBase Sepolia transactionNEAR testnet delivery

  2. 2. Guard refuses a wrong recipient on testnet

    Posted

    x3-guard on NEAR testnet refused an agent payment to attacker.near (mandate_recipient) and registered the same intent paid to the owner's account. Both transactions are final.

    EvidenceRefusal transactionAllowed transaction

  3. 3. Scoped agent vault on testnet

    Pending

    One allowed payment, plus recorded refusals for over-cap, wrong recipient, 24-hour window and redirected refund.

    Next: Publish the allowed payment and all four refusal cases from the public testnet runbook. Local Sandbox tests do not fill this milestone. Inspect the work

  4. 4. One mainnet 1Click swap through Guard

    Posted

    The signed quote, the Guard authorization, the deposit, and the delivery, each with a finalized transaction hash.

    Mainnet evidence and limitsGuard acceptance25 USDC Solana deposit24.9952 USDC NEAR deliveryRecorded outcomeSource files matching the stored hashes

  5. 5. Hostile model refused on mainnet

    Pending

    A red-team model's payments go through the same restricted key, and each refusal is on chain with an attack label.

    Next: Publish labeled hostile-model attempts through the restricted mainnet key and their on-chain refusals. Current red-team evidence is local.

  6. 6. Guard checks the program hash

    Pending

    An approved mandate carries only the exact .x3 program the owner saw. Contract tests cover a mismatched hash.

    Next: Land reviewed program-hash enforcement with mismatch tests. PR #202 is still open at this snapshot; storing a hash alone does not satisfy this gate. Inspect the work

  7. 7. Independent security review

    Pending

    A published report on Guard and the vault, with every finding and its fix.

    Next: Publish an independent review and the disposition of every finding. Internal checks and this evidence review do not count as an independent audit.

  8. 8. Tagged release

    Pending

    A GitHub release with a checksum and build provenance, so nobody has to trust a branch tip.

    Next: Publish a versioned release with checksums and build provenance. A passing branch build is not a release. Inspect the work

One demonstration, four tracks

AI Security & Defense

Recipient and asset allowlists, caps, slippage, fees, expiry, one-use nonces. Compiler off-chain, contract checks on NEAR. The mainnet quote passed 21 checks; hostile-model mainnet refusal evidence remains pending.

Agent Economy

A restricted agent key accepted the mainnet quote after owner approval, and later recorded a Settled outcome. First-party records identify manual Solflare funding; Guard-controlled source custody is still unproven.

Autonomous Business

The owner sets the constraints once: caps, approval threshold, allowlists, refund address and expiry. Guard enforced them on mainnet. invoice_06 was owner-funded and paid to the owner's own account; treasury and revenue features are not built.

Unstoppable DeFi

Official 1Click settlement from Solana to NEAR mainnet, plus the earlier Base Sepolia testnet trade. Each has its own receipts and limits; neither establishes atomic settlement.

.x3 on NEAR

The .X3 community token is planned as a NEP-141 on NEAR mainnet. It is not deployed yet, and nothing here sells it. Its contract and deploy transaction appear here once they are final.

.X3

Symbol .X3 · Standard NEP-141 · Chain NEAR · Not deployed